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Abstract
This research aims to examine the effect of CEO characteristics on pre-earnings
management profitability. CEO characteristics include gender, tenure, age, education level,
founding-family status, and nationality. Pre-earnings management profitability is measured
by return on assets minus discretionary accruals. Data analysis uses firm and year fixedeffect regression analysis. The result shows that female CEO, longer tenure CEO, CEO with
higher education levels, and foreign CEO increase firms' profitability without engaging in
earnings management. On the other hand, there is no effect of CEO age and foundingfamily status on pre-earnings management profitability. This research contributes to filling
the gap of inconsistent previous findings of CEO characteristics and profitability by
considering earnings management behavior.
Keywords: CEO characteristics, profitability, earnings management, pre-earnings
management profitability

Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh karakteristik CEO terhadap profitabilitas
sebelum manajemen laba. Karakteristik CEO terdiri dari gender, tenur, usia, tingkat
pendidikan, status keluarga pendiri, dan warga negara. Profitabilitas sebelum manajemen
laba diukur dengan return on assets dikurang discretionary accruals. Analisis data
menggunakan analisis regresi fixed-effect perusahaan dan tahun. Hasil penelitian
menunjukkan bahwa CEO wanita, CEO dengan tenur yang lebih lama, CEO dengan tingkat
pendidikan yang lebih tinggi, dan CEO asing meningkatkan profitabilitas tanpa melakukan
manajemen laba. Di sisi lain, tidak ada pengaruh usia dan status keluarga pendiri CEO
terhadap profitabilitas sebelum manajemen laba. Penelitian ini berkontribusi untuk
menjawab hasil penelitian terdahulu yang tidak konsisten mengenai karakteristik CEO dan
profitabilitas dengan mempertimbangkan perilaku manajemen laba.
Kata kunci: karakteristik CEO, profitabilitas, manajemen laba, profitabilitas sebelum
manajemen laba
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INTRODUCTION
CEO is the person in charge to lead
the firm and has responsibility for all
business activities. In a two-tier board
system such as Indonesia, the CEO leads as
a top manager in the executive board of
directors and contributes to deciding daily
business activities (Ditta and Setiawan
2019). One of the important goals of the
firms is profit. CEO has an important role
to achieve the goal. Firms' profitability is
often used as CEO performance evaluation.
In Indonesia, it is important to examine the
relationship between CEO and profitability
since most of the Indonesian cases of
CEO's dismissal are initiated by reduction
of profitability (Lindrianasari et al. 2011;
Setiawan et al. 2017).
As an upper echelons theory by
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick
(2007), CEO characteristics determine the
decision-making behavior to increase firms'
profitability such as gender, tenure, age,
education level, founding-family status,
and nationality. First, females tend to have
stable and mature characteristics (Wani and
Masih 2015), risk-averse preference of
investment (Croson and Gneezy 2009), and
multitasking (Ruderman et al. 2002).
Female CEO also depends on factual event
and detailed information to make a decision
(Anggraeni et al. 2016). Although her
counterpart of a male CEO also has a
different style to improve performance, in
the context that risk reduction leads to
higher and stable growth, a female CEO
style of management is more likely to
reduce uncertainty to increase profitability
(Jadiyappa et al. 2019).
Second, CEO tenure is an indicator of
a specific experience as a CEO in a specific
firm. Longer CEO tenure shows the higher
experience of firms' business environment
and characteristics had by CEO. CEO with
longer tenure can make effective decisions
(Shakir 2009).
Third, similar to tenure characteristics, CEO age is also an indicator of
general experience and career had by CEO
(Hambrick 2007; Hambrick and Mason
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1984). An older CEO has higher
experiences than a younger one (Peni,
2014). Since experiences are one of the
most important factors to make an effective
decision (Wei et al. 2005), longer tenure
and older CEO increases profitability.
Fourth, CEO education level also
shows the ability of CEO (Hambrick 2007;
Hambrick and Mason 1984). Higher
education level indicates that a CEO has
higher cognitive complexity to find a new
idea of business (Davila and Foster 2007).
Higher educated CEO can improve firms’
profitability.
Fifth, the founding-family status of
the CEO shows that CEO has the
characteristics of the firms' founder. The
founder has a strong knowledge and
experience of firms' business since it is
founded (Andres 2008). The founder also
needs to keep the firms' reputation and does
sustainable business by maintaining a good
relationship with employees (Ward 1988),
selecting reputable suppliers (Andres
2008), and maintaining financing risk
(Anderson et al. 2003). Founders' characteristics will be absorbed more by their
family members than by outsiders. When
the founder, or the member of the founding
family, becomes CEO, they tend to use the
founder's value to improve profitability.
Sixth,
a
foreign
CEO
has
international experience as a unique
competitive advantage to improve firms’
profitability (Le and Kroll 2017). Compare
to their counterpart of local CEOs, foreign
CEOs can create a unique business strategy
across countries and have the ability to
understand the international market (Le and
Kroll 2017).
Some studies find that executive
directors’ characteristics of gender (Jalbert
et al. 2013; Susanti et al. 2018), tenure
(Shakir 2009; Juenke 2005), age (Emilia
Peni 2014; Wei et al. 2005), an education
level (Cheng et al. 2010; Saidu 2019),
founding-family status (Cai et al. 2012),
and foreign nationality (Le and Kroll 2017;
Pradono and Widowati 2016) increase
firms’ performance. On the other hand,
some studies provide conflicting findings.
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Wachudi and Mboya (2012) find that there
is no effect of gender diversification on
return on assets. Anggraeni et al. (2016) do
not find any significant relationship
between CEO tenure and firms’ performance. Amin and Sunarjanto (2016) and
Eduardo and Poole (2016) also do not find
any significant relationship between the
executive board and CEO age and firms’
performance. Gottesman and Morey (2010)
and Lindorff and Jonson (2013) do not find
a significant effect of CEO education level
on financial performance. Peng and Jiang
(2010) find the negative effect of family
representation in the executive board on
firms’ performance. Wijaya and Suprasto
(2015) do not find any significant
relationship between nationality diversity
on firms ‘ performance.
Inconsistent findings of executive directors and firms’ profitability and performance come from the strategy selection of
earnings management practice. There are
some arguments to explain why earnings
management practice is the factor of inconsistent findings between executive directors
and firms’ profitability and performance.
First, earnings management generally is the
managers’ intervention to affect earnings
numbers in financial reporting (Healy and
Wahlen 1999). In this case, earnings
management can be an option for executive
directors to affect reported performance.
Second, when managers’ performance is
determined by accounting numbers from
the financial report, there is a possibility
that the performance measurement contains
bias since accounting numbers can be
manipulated through earnings management
(Hsieh et al. 2018; Demerjian et al. 2012).
Third, some studies find that different
executive directors’ characteristics lead to a
different approach to earnings management
practice when executive directors improve
performance. Hsieh et al. (2018) find that
executive directors with higher knowledge
and longer tenure improve firms’ performance through earnings management while
Qi et al. (2018) find that female and older
executive directors improve performance
without engaging in earnings management.

Earnings management behavior aims
to manage profit numbers (Healy and
Wahlen 1999; Sloan 1996; Richardson et
al. 2005) by using the loophole of
accounting method and estimation (Scott
2014). Earnings management includes
profit-increasing (aggressive) and profitdecreasing (conservative) behavior (Institute of Management Accountants 2018).
Earnings management makes profitability
evaluation cannot reflect the real firms'
condition (Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012).
Both executives’ characteristics and
profitability relate to earnings management
behavior. The strategy of earnings
management is determined by executives’
characteristics. The case of Toshiba in 2015
shows the profit mark-up to USD 1.2
billion in 7 years (Prasetya and Gayatri
2016). It leads to firm value reduction until
USD 13.4 billion and makes the CEO,
Hisao Tanaka, and other 8 top managers
resign from their managerial position. It
shows that CEO takes the full
responsibility
for
profitability-related
strategy selection including earnings
management strategy.
Some earnings manipulation cases in
Indonesia affect the firms’ CEOs. In 2016,
PT Hanson International manipulate its
financial report by boosting its revenues.
Indonesian Finacial Service Authority
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) penalizes the
CEO of PT Hanson International as much
as IDR 5 billion (Idris 2020). In 2020, PT
Jiwasraya has been found that they
manipulate their earnings since 2006 and
leads their former CEO to prison (C. A.
Putri 2020). In 2017, a survey of Edelmann
Trust Barometer shows that Indonesian
CEO credibility touches the lowest point
where 63% of respondents have moderate
to low trust in CEO performance (Center
for Risk Management & Sustainability
2018). Since there is Indonesian CEO
credibility reduction, also some cases lead
CEOs to take full responsibility for
earnings manipulation to cover their bad
performance, it is important to examine the
true or fair performance (for instance,
profitability that is free from earnings
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management) that can be achieved by the
CEOs.
Although CFOs have the main
responsibility for financial reporting and
accounting policy (Beasley et al. 2010),
this research focuses more on the CEO.
First, the CEO is the top leader in the firm.
CEO has more authority to decide the
business strategy to achieve profitability
and authorize the use of accounting policy
for financial reporting (Bouaziz et al. 2020;
Ittner et al. 1997). Second, the CEO gives
more concern about earnings management
since CEO performance is evaluated by
earnings number to determine CEO
compensation (Ittner et al. 1997). Third, a
survey by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations
of
the
Treadway
Commission (COSO) shows that CEO
involves more in financial manipulation
than CFOs (Beasley et al. 2010). To avoid
the difference of accounting and financial
knowledge between CEO and CFO, this
research use CEO accounting and financial
experience as variable control.
In the context of behavioral theory in
the accounting field (Kutluk 2017), CEO
characteristics determine CEO behavior
towards accounting policy including the
selection of accounting methods and
estimation to manage earnings. Barua et al.
(2010) and Peni and Vahamaa (2010) find
that female executives engage more in
accounting conservatism than aggressive
ones where they recognize more the loss
potential than the profit one as an impact of
risk-averse behavior. Ali and Zhang (2015)
find that CEO tenure affects earnings
management behavior. Putri and Rusmanto
(2019) CEO tenure and age have a
significant effect on earnings management.
Qi et al. (2018) also find that CEO
education and age affect earnings
management. Santoso dan Rakhman (2013)
and Dwiyanti and Astriena (2018) find the
role of founding-family reduce earnings
management. Enofe et al. (2017) also find
that foreign executives reduce aggressive
earnings management behavior, while
Khalil et al. (2020) finds that foreign
investor needs accounting conservatism.
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Since earnings management leads to
a biased evaluation between executives'
characteristics and profitability, it is important to measure the profitability before
earnings management is included to show
the real performance of the CEO. This
research aims to examine the effect of CEO
characteristics on pre-earnings management
profitability. Previous studies do not consider the earnings management behavior to
examine the effect CEO characteristics,
such as gender (Jalbert et al. 2013; Susanti
et al. 2018; Wachudi and Mboya 2012),
tenure (Anggraeni et al. 2016; Shakir 2009;
Juenke 2005), age (Emilia Peni 2014; Wei
et al. 2005; Amin and Sunarjanto 2016;
Eduardo and Poole 2016), an education
level (Cheng et al. 2010; Saidu 2019;
Gottesman and Morey 2010; Lindorff and
Prior Jonson 2013), founding-family status
(Cai et al. 2012; Peng and Jiang 2010) and
foreign nationality (Le and Kroll 2017;
Pradono and Widowati 2016; Wijaya and
Suprasto 2015) on profitability. As
previous studies find that CEOs involves in
earnings management behavior (Barua et
al. 2010; Ali and Zhang 2015; E. A. Putri
and Rusmanto 2019; Qi et al. 2018;
Santoso and Rakhman 2013), this research
considers earnings management behavior to
examine the effect of CEO characteristics
on profitability by excluding the earnings
management from profitability.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Corporate Governance in Indonesia
Different from the one-tier board
system such as in the US, Indonesia implements the two-tier board system. One-tier
board system refers to the corporate
governance system where the board of
directors (executive and non-executive) is
one body (Aluchna 2013). One-tier board is
usually implemented in Anglo-Saxon
countries such as the US, the UK, Spain,
Italy, Canada, Australia, and India (Mallin
2016). Indonesia implements the two tierboard systems where the board of directors
is formed separately into the board of

120

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, December 2021, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, pg. 116-147

commissioners (non-executive) and board
of executive directors. Based on UU 40
2007 about “Limited Companies", the
board of executive directors has full
responsibility for firms' business activities
while the board of commissioners has the
responsibility to do monitoring and
oversight on board of executive directors.
In the context of CEOs' roles, there
are some implications of the two-tier board
system in Indonesia. A two-tier board
system offers the independent role of CEOs
(Cho and Rui 2009). As the separation of
the board of commissioners and executive
directors, there is no significant relationship between CEOs and the board of
commissioners, so the board of commissioners can implement effective monitoring
on CEOs without intervention from CEOs
or other executive directors. Different from
a one-tier board system, the duality role of
CEOs as the CEOs and the board chairman
may exist (Spencer Stuart 2015) and can
disturb the monitoring role of nonexecutive directors and leads to lower
firms’ profitability (Mubeen et al. 2021).
However, the two-tier board system does
not allow efficient information flows and
knowledge sharing between CEOs and
boards of commissioners since the board of
commissioners and executive directors are
separated (Jungmann 2006). Yang and
Zhao (2014) find that the close relationship
between CEOs and supervisory boards
leads to lower information costs and faster
decision-making.
The role of shareholders is also
different between Indonesia and other
Anglo-Saxon countries. In Anglo-Saxon
countries such as the US, the ownership
structure is dispersed while in two-tier
board system countries such as Indonesia,
the ownership structure is concentrated
(Sun 2019). The concentrated ownership
structure allows controlling shareholders to
take an important role in the firms.
Concentrated ownership can reduce
managers-shareholders conflict and leads to
higher firms’ performance (Choi 2018).
However, concentrated ownership also
leads to abuse of power and higher

minority-majority shareholders’ conflict
(Choi 2018; La Porta et al. 1999). Some
studies find that concentrated ownership
leads to higher earnings management and
lower earnings quality (Leuz et al. 2003;
Grimaldi and Muserra 2017). In the context
of CEOs’ roles, concentrated ownership
allows CEOs to fulfill the private benefits
of controlling shareholders by engaging in
earnings management.
In the context of Indonesia, the
monitoring role of the board of
commissioners leads CEOs to improve
profitability while there is the possibility
that CEOs engage in earnings management
to improve profitability as controlling
shareholders tend to abuse their power to
reduce earnings quality. It leads to a biased
performance evaluation of CEOs. This
research mitigates the biased performance
evaluation by measuring the profitability
before earnings management involvement.
Behavioral Theory
In the beginning, the behavioral
theory comes from the social field that explains individuals' behavior by analyzing
the antecedents and consequences around
them (Angell 2013). Further, the behavioral
theory is developed in other fields
including the accounting field. In the
context of accounting, behavioral theory
explains the relationship between an
individual with accounting issues by
understanding, analyzing, and predicting
individuals' behavior when they face
accounting issues (Kutluk 2017). Factors of
cognitive and affective can determine how
individuals behave towards accounting
(Kutluk 2017).
In this case, CEO characteristics of
cognitive (such as age, tenure, education
level,
founding-family
status,
and
nationality) and affective (such as gender
and founding-family status) are examined
to determine CEO behavior towards profitability. Age and tenure show the cognitive
characteristic of competence that is got
from experience had by the CEO. Education level shows the cognitive characteristic
of knowledge that is got from formal edu
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cation taken by the CEO. Founding-family
status level shows the cognitive characteristic of CEO knowledge that is got from
firm
founder
and
also
affective
characteristic of emotional to maintain
family reputation. Gender shows affective
characteristics of CEO emotional towards
risk-taking behavior.
Upper Echelons Theory
The upper echelons theory explains
that firms’ strategy and output are determined by how managers interpret the
businesses’ condition and environment
(Hambrick 2007; Hambrick and Mason
1984). Managers’ interpretation depends on
the managers’ characteristics that shape
their attributes of cognitive, value, and
viewpoint (Hambrick and Mason 1984). In
this case, CEO characteristics are important
to determine the firms' output of
profitability. Some of the CEO characteristics are gender, tenure, age, education,
founding-family status, and nationality.
Agency Theory
Agency theory explains the relationship between the principal (shareholders)
and agent (managers) (Jensen and
Meckling
1976).
Shareholders
and
managers have different interests that lead
to agency conflict where shareholders
expect to have higher wealth and value
while managers have interests of higher
compensation. Greater agency conflict also
comes from information asymmetry where
managers have more information about
firms' daily business activities than shareholders have. In this case, managers tend to
use the information asymmetry condition
by engaging in earnings management.
Earnings management will affect the firms'
profitability, also, managers' performance.
As the top manager, the CEO also has the
opportunity to engage in earnings
management behavior to affect their
performance evaluation.
Earnings Management
Earnings management refers to
managers’ behavior (in this case, it refers to

121

CEOs’ behavior as top managers) to
manage the profit numbers by sing the
accounting standard loophole that triggered
by motivations of compensation, debt
contracting, or political costs (Scott 2014).
Earnings management is a critical issue
since the big financial scandal in the late
1990s and early 2000s by Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom, and Xerox who cover up their
poor profitability by managing profit (Litt
et al. 2014). Since profit is the main
concern for firms' profitability evaluation,
there is a close relationship between
earnings management and profitability
performance. When firms do not reach a
certain level of profitability, they are more
likely to engage in earnings management
(Healy and Wahlen 1999; Sloan 1996;
Richardson et al. 2005; Muslim 2020).
There are two types of earnings
management which are aggressive profitincreasing and conservative profitdecreasing (Institute of Management
Accountants 2018). Aggressive profitincreasing refers to earnings management
to boos-up profit numbers based on higher
compensation. Aggressive profit-increasing
earnings management is used to avoid
losses or negative profit numbers (2002)
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), beat
previous profit (Abarbanell and Lehavy
2003), or meet analysts' forecasts (Payne
and Robb 2000; Das and Zhang 2003).
Most aggressive profit-increasing earnings
management is done when CEO has a
greater incentive for compensation or debtcontract violation (Scott 2014; Watts and
Zimmerman 1978).
Conservative profit-decreasing refers
to earnings management to decrease profit
numbers based on uncertain conditions.
Conservative itself refers to behavior to
recognizes bad news and loss potential and
delays the good news and gains potential
(Penman and Zhang 2002). Most conservative profit-decreasing earnings management
is done when CEO has a greater incentive
to reduce higher costs for having higher
profit and greater uncertainty (Scott 2014;
Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Some
studies find that CEO engages more in
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earnings management to decrease profit
when the CEO faces the uncertainties of
investment (Arif et al. 2016), higher
volatility of stock return (Cormier et al.
2013), greater tax payment (Scott 2014),
and environmental issues (Yao and Liu
2020).
This research eliminates the earnings
management components out from
profitability because it leads to a biased
profitability performance evaluation. Real
firms' condition occurs when earnings
management is excluded. It is important to
examine the profitability before earnings
management since only the CEO and
internal management know more about real
firms' performance than external parties
(Jara-Bertin and Sepulveda 2016). There
are previous studies that examine the firms’
profitability before earnings management
(Tran and Duong 2020; Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda
2016).
Jara-Bertin
and
Sepulveda (2016) examine the pre-earnings
management profitability in foundingfamily firms and find that founding-family
firms
have
higher
pre-earnings
management profitability than non-family
ones. Tran and Duong (2020) examine the
earnings management motivation and find
that negative pre-earnings management
profit leads to higher earnings management
behavior.
Based on the theory of upper echelons, the strategy of earnings management
is based on CEO characteristics. On one
hand, previous studies find that CEO and
other executives characteristics of gender
(Barua et al. 2010; E Peni and Vahamaa
2010), tenure (Ali and Zhang 2015; E. A.
Putri and Rusmanto 2019), age (E. A. Putri
and Rusmanto 2019; Qi et al. 2018),
founding-family status (Santoso and
Rakhman 2013; Dwiyanti and Astriena
2018), and nationality (Enofe et al. 2017)
have an effect on earnings management
behavior. On the other hand, some studies
find that executives’ characteristics of gender (E. A. Putri and Rusmanto 2019), an
education level (Fatimah 2019), foundingfamily status (Lestari and Harindahyani
2017), and nationality (Setyawan and

Anggraita 2018) have no effect on earnings
management. Since earnings management
brings a bias to CEO performance evaluation, also, since the inconsistent findings of
CEO and other executives' characteristics
on earnings management bring a biased
relationship between CEO and profitability,
this research eliminates the earnings
management components from profitability
measurement to ensure that CEO characteristics can determine firms’ profitability
without engaging in earnings management.
Hypothesis Development
This research develops the research
hypotheses in the context of the two-tier
board system and concentrated ownership
structure in Indonesia. On one hand, the
two-tier board system allows CEOs to
improve profitability as there is an effective
monitoring role by the board of commissioners where they are separated from the
board of directors although the two-tier
board system also decreases the knowledge
sharing between commissioners’ members
and executive directors. On the other hand,
CEOs may improve profitability by
engaging in earnings management as there
is a possibility that concentrated ownership
allows CEOs to do so. This research
examines the role of CEOs in Indonesia to
improve profitability without engaging in
earnings management. In this research, the
role of CEOs in Indonesia is determined by
the characteristics of gender, tenure, age,
education, founding-family status, and
nationality.
CEO
Gender
and
Pre-Earnings
Management Profitability
Gender does not only refer to
sexuality terms but also defines a specific
nature that is attached to a specific gender
based on the social and cultural contexts
where the social and cultural contexts bring
out a different social and cultural role
between a male and a female. Although
both males and females do the same job in
the firms, they have different ways to do it.
According to upper echelons theory, the
female has different cognitive, value, and

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, December 2021, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, pg. 116-147

perception on the firms' business condition
compare to a male to make a specific
strategy. Cognitive, value, and perception
characteristics can be affected by psychological, biological, social, and cultural
terms. Based on a psychological term, the
female has a stable and mature emotion
because the female gets into a mature age
earlier than a male (Wani and Masih 2015).
Based on a biological term, a female has a
lower testosterone hormone than a male
(Sapienza et al. 2009). Since the testosterone hormone can bring higher adrenaline
and riskier action, females tend to do less
risky behavior (Sapienza et al. 2009). A
stable, mature, and less risky behavior
brings a female CEO to make a decision
carefully and effectively. It can lead to
higher profitability. Based on a social and
cultural term, especially in Indonesia, the
female has the ability of multitasking since
she can do various things almost at the
same time in her family and home so she
can bring the ability into the firms (Ruderman et al. 2002). A multitasking ability
leads a female CEO to do various work in
the firms which leads to efficiency. It also
can lead to higher profitability. Jalbert et al.
(2013) and Susanti et al. (2018) find that
female executive directors increase firms’
performance.
On the other hand, Wachudi and
Mboya (2012) find that there is no effect of
gender diversification on firms’ performance. There is a possibility that earnings
management is included in the business
strategy
implementation.
Inconsistent
findings of CEO gender and firms’ performance may come from the male CEO also
generates higher profitability by engaging
in earnings management. Aggressive and
risk-taking characteristics make male CEO
increase profit by using a strategy of
aggressive
earnings-profit
earnings
management.
Although the risk-averse behavior
brings a female CEO avoids an aggressive
profit-increasing earnings management, it
can bring a female CEO to engage more in
conservative profit-decreasing earnings
management, especially when she faces the
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uncertainty condition (Heminway 2007;
Barua et al. 2010; E Peni and Vahamaa
2010). It happens because a female CEO
does not only care about the financial performance but also her social status
(Backhaus et al. 2002). In this case, there is
a possibility that real firms’ profitability is
higher than a reported one when the firms
are led by a female CEO. In another case, a
female CEO also engages in aggressive
profit-increasing earnings management
especially when she faces a lower risk of
litigation costs (Zalata et al. 2019). It shows
that there is also a possibility that firms’
profitability is lower than it should be when
the firms are led by a female CEO. Based
on the competitive advantages of stable and
mature behavior, risk-averse, and multitasking ability, a female CEO can increase
profitability without engaging in earnings
management. Oppositely, a male CEO has
lower profitability without engaging in
earnings management.
In the context of concentrated ownership in Indonesia, controlling shareholders
tend to engage in earnings management to
gain private benefits (Leuz et al. 2003;
Grimaldi and Muserra 2017). However,
controlling shareholders also can use their
superior position to provide effective
monitoring to increase profitability (Choi
2018). In this case, as females have higher
ethics and are risk-averse (Heminway
2007; Barua et al. 2010; E Peni and
Vahamaa 2010; Backhaus et al. 2002),
female CEOs can avoid the earnings
management behavior to gain privates
benefits of controlling shareholders and
improve profitability.
H1: Female CEO has a positive effect
on pre-earnings management profitability.
CEO
Tenure
and
Pre-Earnings
Management Profitability
Tenure is defined as a cumulative
period in a specific job position. CEO
tenure refers to a cumulative period as a
CEO in a specific firm (Shakir 2009). CEO
tenure defines a specific experience and
knowledge as a CEO to capture the under

124

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, December 2021, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, pg. 116-147

stating level about the firms. A longer
tenure CEO has better experience,
knowledge, and understanding to make an
effective decision and policy for the firms.
Juenke (2005) and Shakir (2009) find that
longer CEO tenure has a positive effect on
firms’ performance.
On the other hand, Anggraeni et al.
(2016) do not find any significant relationship between CEO tenure and firms’
performance. There is a chance that a
shorter tenure CEO also brings higher
profitability by engaging in aggressive
earnings-profit earnings management.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that
market participants always have doubt in
shorter tenure CEO for having no longer
performance track record to ensure CEO
succession. There are no rewards for
shorter tenure CEO’ performance (Oyer
2008) but there is a punishment for shorter
tenure CEO's failure (Ali and Zhang 2015).
It motivates shorter tenure CEO to engage
in aggressive earnings-profit earnings
management to boost up profitability. In
contrast, loner tenure CEO already has a
sufficient performance track record and
reputation (Ali and Zhang 2015). For
longer tenure CEO, reputation comes first
and earnings management behavior will be
avoided. Longer tenure CEO increases
profitability by using higher knowledge and
experience without earnings management
behavior while shorter tenure CEO, without
aggressive
profit-increasing
earnings
management, has lower profitability.
The two-tier board system, as
implemented in Indonesia, does not allow
CEO to enjoy knowledge sharing between
executive directors and commissioners as
they are in separated boards (Jungmann
2006). In this case, CEO with longer tenure
can utilize their long experience and higher
knowledge to mitigate the disadvantage of
the two-tier board system. CEO with longer
tenure can improve profitability by using
their experience and knowledge.
H2: CEO tenure has a positive effect on
pre-earnings
management
profitability.

CEO Age and Pre-Earnings Management
Profitability
Hambrick and Mason (1984) explain
age is one of the CEO demographic characteristics that affect CEO behavior to make a
business decision. Similar to tenure
characteristics, age also is an indicator of
cumulative experiences, career line, and
commitment (Hambrick and Mason 1984;
Eduardo and Poole 2016; Mathieu and
Zajac 1990). Peni (2014) assumes that
older CEO has the long experience to be
used to gather more information and
literature than a younger one. Older CEO
can make an effective strategy to increase
profitability. Peni (2014) and Wei et al.
(2005) find that older CEO has a positive
effect on firms’ performance. In the context
of the two-tier board system in Indonesia, a
younger CEO will be difficult to gain
knowledge
from
the
board
of
commissioners. As older CEO has longer
cumulative experiences and career line,
older CEO will enjoy the advantage of
experience to improve profitability.
On the other hand, Amin and
Sunarjanto (2016) and Eduardo and Poole
(2016) do not find any significant
relationship between executives' age and
firms’ performance. Younger CEO also can
increase profitability by engaging in
aggressive
profit-increasing
earnings
management. Younger CEO has a lower
concern about financial and career stability
(Wiersema and Bantel 1992), higher risktaking behavior, and lower organizational
commitment (Mathieu and Zajac 1990). A
younger CEO is more likely to engage in
earnings management than an older one (Qi
et al. 2018). In this case, an older CEO
increases profitability by using longer
experience without earnings management
behavior while a younger CEO, without
aggressive
profit-increasing
earnings
management, has lower profitability.
H3: CEO age has a positive effect on
pre-earnings
management
profitability.
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CEO Education and Pre-Earnings Management Profitability
Becker (1985) explains that education
level is one of the human capital factors
that provide the skill to increase
productivity. Higher education level allows
managers to increase their capacity and
productivity (Fahmia and Mulyono 2015).
Based on the upper echelon theory,
education level is one of the CEO
characteristics that affect decision-making
(Hambrick and Mason 1984). A CEO with
a higher education level has higher thinking
complexity, ability, and innovation to
implement business strategy effectively
(Davila and Foster 2007). Higher education
levels also provide more cognitive ability
to analyze information (Nadkarni and
Herrmann 2010). Cheng et al. (2010) find
that higher education had by the executive
board increases firms' performance. Higher
education level is important to mitigate the
disadvantage of a two-tier board system
that does not allow efficient information
flows and knowledge sharing between
CEOs and board of commissioners since
the board of commissioners and executive
directors are separated (Jungmann 2006).
On the other hand, Gottesman and
Morey (2010) and Lindorff and Jonson
(2013) do not find any significant effect of
CEO education level on financial performance. There is a possibility that CEOs
with higher education level uses their
ability to engage in earnings management.
Since higher thinking complexity and more
cognitive ability allow the CEO to have a
higher knowledge of firms' financial
reporting environment and engage more in
earnings management. Qi et al. (2018) find
that education level has a positive effect on
earnings management. It makes a bias for
the relationship between CEO education
level and firms’ profitability. In this case,
CEOs with higher education levels can use
their ability to increase profitability without
engaging in earnings management.
H4: CEO education level has a positive
effect on pre-earnings management
profitability.
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CEO Founding-Family Status and PreEarnings Management Profitability
Santoso and Rakhman (2013) and
Dwiyanti and Astriena (2018) suggest that
the founding-family role in firms' leadership brings higher effectivity and
monitoring function because the foundingfamily has interests to maintain firms' reputation. Andres (2008) also suggests that the
founders and their families have a higher
knowledge of the firm since it is founded.
Founding-family characteristics have a
positive effect on firms’ performance
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Craig and
Dibrell 2006; González-Cruz and Cruz-Ros
2016; Tsao et al. 2016; Yasser et al. 2017;
Vieira 2014). Founding-family characteristics are also embedded in the CEO with
founding-family status. It indicates that
founding-family CEO increases firms’
performance. In the case of the Indonesian
context, most founding-family firms in
Indonesia have concentrated ownership and
lead founding-family as controlling shareholders (Santoso and Rakhman 2013). By
appointing the member of the family as
CEO, founding-family shareholders run
their monitoring function and ensure that
CEO can achieve better profitability.
On the other hand, Peng and Jiang
(2010) find the negative effect of family
representation in the executive board on
firms’ performance. Non-founding family
CEO has no emotional relationship to keep
firms’ reputation and has lower knowledge
of firms’ characteristics than a foundingfamily one. It leads non-founding family
CEO to increase profitability by engaging
in aggressive profit-increasing earnings
management. Meanwhile, founding-family
CEO needs to maintain the firms' reputation by engaging less in earnings management. Wang (2006) and Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) find that the founding-family role
reduces earnings management behavior that
harms firms' reputations. Both nonfounding and founding-family CEOs
respectively have higher profitability with
and without earnings management which
leads to a biased relationship between CEO
founding-family status and profitability. In
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this case, founding-family CEO increases
profitability by higher knowledge of firms’
characteristics and providing effective
monitoring without earnings management
behavior while a non-family founding
CEO, without aggressive profit-increasing
earnings management, has lower profitability. Jara-Bertin and Sepulveda (2016)
find that founding-family firms have higher
profitability than non-family ones without
engaging in earnings management.
H5: Founding-family CEO has a positive
effect on pre-earnings management
profitability.
CEO Nationality and Pre-Earnings
Management Profitability
CEO nationality refers to the CEO's
country of origin and citizenship as a
foreign or Indonesian/local CEO. A foreign
CEO does not only have cross-business,
sector, or industry experience but also a
cross-country one. A cross-country
experience is important to develop firms'
strategies (Tams 2013), especially to
develop a global market network. Foreign
CEO relates to foreign funding access,
cross-country market network, and better
global point of view than local CEO that
can be used in the host country to increase
firms' performance (Le and Kroll 2017). A
foreign CEO also has a unique experience
about the social, economic, and political
environment in the home country that can
be used as additional information and
knowledge to develop a business strategy
in the host country. Characteristics of
foreign CEO can help firms to increase
profitability. Knowledge and experience of
global business allow foreign CEO to
mitigate the disadvantage of a two-tier
system that does not allow knowledge
sharing between executive directors and
commissioners’ members. Le and Kroll
(2017) find a positive effect of foreign
CEO on performance.
On the other hand, Wijaya and
Suprasto (2015) do not find any significant
relationship between nationality diversity
on firms ‘ performance. There is a chance
that a local CEO also has higher

profitability by engaging in aggressive
profit-increasing earnings management.
Compare to their counterpart of local
CEOs, foreign CEOs are less likely to
engage in earnings management because
they tend to avoid a culture of politeness to
other local executives and more open mind
and transparent (Chiu et al. 2013) to reduce
more problems in the future (Enofe et al.
2017). Local CEO behavior to engage more
in aggressive profit-increasing earnings
management make a bias for the relationship between CEO nationality and
profitability. A foreign CEO can use a
unique cross-country strategy to improve
profitability without earnings management
behavior while a local CEO, without
earnings management, will have lower
profitability.
There is also a possibility that a
foreign CEO engages in conservative
profit-decreasing earnings management.
Khalil et al. (2020) find that institutional
foreign shareholders need accounting conservatism since they face the uncertainty of
information disadvantages relative to their
domestic peers. Conservative profitdecreasing earnings management also
brings a bias to the relationship between
CEO nationality and profitability. It shows
that a foreign CEO has higher profitability
than a reported one.
H6: Foreign (non-Indonesian) CEO has a
positive effect on pre-earnings
management profitability.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample
The research sample includes
manufacturing firms listed on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange 2012-2018.
This research considers Ahmed and Azim
(2015) and Rasmussen (2013) that
manufacturing firms experience higher
uncertainty of revenues and profit that
leads to higher earnings management
behavior. This research also uses
manufacturing firms to avoid industry
characteristics differences. Compare to
other industries, the manufacturing industry
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Table 1
Research Sample
Sample Criteria
Manufacturing Firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 2012-2018
Incomplete annual report
Incomplete CEO profile data
Net Sample

Firm
123
(5)
(23)
95

Firm-Years
851
(35)
(151)
665

(1)

(2)
(3)
has a different characteristic that leads to a
different level of accruals to engage in
earnings management (Effiong et al. 2020).
The manufacturing industry has higher
accruals estimation from higher credit sales
(Rasmussen 2013) that leads to higher bad
debt expenses estimation, accounting
method
for
inventory
valuation
(Sulistyawati et al. 2019), and fixed assets
intensity (Fakhroni et al. 2018) that leads to
depreciation method. Research period of
2012-2018 based on the regulations of
Keputusan BAPEPAM-LK Nomor: KEP431/BL/2012 and Surat Edaran Otoritas
Jasa Keuangan Nomor 30 /SEOJK.04/2016
about executives’ profiles disclosures in
annual report. These two regulations
regulate more detailed disclosures about
executives’ profiles (e.g. name, age,
nationality, education, and position tenure)
than the previous regulation of Keputusan
BAPEPAM-LK Nomor: KEP-134/BL/2006
that only regulate general information of
executives’ profiles (e.g. name, position,
and other brief information). The sample
consists of 665 firm-years as in table 1.
Measurement of Pre-Earnings Management Profitability
There are two components of preearnings management profitability which
are profitability and earnings management.
Profitability is measured by return on assets
where earnings after tax are divided by

lagged total assets as in equation 1 (Tran
and Duong 2020; Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda 2016). Earnings management is
measured by discretionary accruals performance-based estimation by Kothari et al.
(2005) as used by Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda (2016) and Tran and Duong
(2020) to measure pre-earnings management profitability. Basically, earnings
management consists of accrual earnings
management and real earnings management
(Roychowdhury 2006), but previous studies
only provide the measurement of
preearnings management profitability by
using accrual earnings management
(e.g.(Tran and Duong 2020; Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda 2016) and there is still no study
that uses real earnings management to
determine pre-earnings management profitability. Model of discretionary accruals
performance-based uses firm fixed-effect
regression model as in equation 2 (Kothari
et al. 2005). Firm fixed-effect in equation 2
aims to control the different accounting
policy and method that is used by different
firms.
The value of e in equation 2 is
discretionary accruals. Instead of using the
absolute value of discretionary accruals,
this research uses the magnitude value of
discretionary accruals to capture different
approaches of earnings management (for
instance: profit-increasing earnings management and profit-decreasing earnings
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management) to adjust the level of
profitability before earnings management
practice. As the discretionary accruals are
the estimation of residual value (value of e)
in equation 2 and the mean value of
residual value is zero (or almost/close to
zero) (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995),
this research follows the suggestion by
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and
Kothari et al. (2005) that discretionary
accruals value that is above zero (positive
value of the value of e) is an indicator of
profit-increasing earnings management
while discretionary accruals value that is
below zero (negative value of the value of
e) is an indicator of profit-decreasing
earnings management.
The positive value of e shows the use
of discretionary accruals components as
aggressive
profit-increasing
earnings
management. Profit-increasing earnings
management is considered as an aggressive
financial reporting since managers boost up
the earnings number by recognizing the
future income and revenue earlier and
delaying the recognition of current
expenses to avoid losses or earnings
reduction (Islam et al. 2011; The Auditing
Practice Board 2001). In this case, preearnings management profitability occurs
when aggressive profit-increasing earnings
management is eliminated from the current
profitability as in equation 3.
The negative value of e shows the use
of discretionary accruals components as
conservative profit-decreasing earnings
management. Profit-decreasing earnings
management is considered as conservative
financial reporting based on the argument
that conservatism allows managers to delay
the future income and recognize the future
expenses to the current period (A. S.
Ahmed and Duellman 2013) while profitdecreasing earnings management is
executed by recognizing the future
expenses to the current period and delaying
the recognition of current income or
revenue (Islam et al. 2011; The Auditing
Practice Board 2001). For instance, Peni
and Vahamaa (2010) find female directors
have a characteristic of conservatism and

lead them more to negative discretionary
accruals (profit-decreasing earnings management). Although conservatism can be
used as a tool of prudence to face future
risk (A. S. Ahmed and Duellman 2013), it
can also not provide the “fair or true” level
of the current earnings (The Auditing Practice Board 2001). In this case, pre-earnings
management profitability occurs when
conservative profit-decreasing earnings
mana-gement is eliminated from the current
profitability as in equation 3.
Earnings consist of components of
operating cash flow and accruals (Dechow
1994). The accruals component of earnings
consists of non-discretionary accruals and
discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary
accruals are accruals component that is
subject to industry and business risk and
condition while discretionary accruals are
accruals component that is subject to
managers’ estimation (Jones 1991; Dechow
et al. 1995). For instance, non-discretionary
accruals can be seen as the predictive value
of accruals (the difference of earnings and
operating cash flow) in equation 2 while
the value of e in equation 2 shows the
discretionary
accruals.
Pre-earnings
management profitability as in equation 3
is measured by return on assets minus
discre-tionary accruals where discretionary
accruals are the value of e in equation 2
(Tran and Duong 2020; Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda 2016). In this case, pre-earnings
management profitability shows the component of operating cash flow and accruals
component that is subject to industry and
business risk and condition (nondiscretionary accruals) by eliminating the
accruals component that is subject to managers’ estimation (discretionary accruals).
Measurement of CEO Characteristics
CEO characteristics include gender,
tenure, age, education level, foundingfamily status, and nationality. CEO gender
is measured by a dummy variable where
score 1 for female CEO and score 0 for
male CEO (Zalata et al. 2019). Gender
information is provided in the annual report
as the photo or when the profile mentions
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(4)
the CEO as “she” or “he”. CEO tenure is
measured by the number of years a current
CEO takes the CEO position since the first
appointment (Shakir 2009). Regarding
tenure information, the annual report
provides the date of CEO appointment or
re-appointment in the CEO profile. CEO
age is measured by the number of years of
age of the current CEO (Emilia Peni 2014).
Regarding age information, the annual
report also provides the CEO age or CEO
date of birth.
CEO education level is measured by
a scoring method. Score 1 for high school
graduated CEO, score 2 for associate
degree graduated CEO, score 3 for bachelor
degree graduated CEO, score 4 for master
degree graduated CEO, score 5 for
doctorate graduated CEO (Qi et al. 2018).
Regarding education information, the
annual report provides information on the
last educational level that has been taken by
the CEO.
CEO founding-family status is
measured by a dummy variable where score
1 if CEO is also firm’ founder or family
member of firm’ founders by blood or
marriage, and score 0 if otherwise (Santoso
and Rakhman 2013). Firm’ founder
information can be accessed in annual
reports, prospectus, firm websites, or
search engines (such as www.google.com).
The family had by the founder can be
accessed on the firm's websites or search
engines (such as www.google.com). The
relationship between the CEO and the
founder can be accessed in annual reports,
firm websites, or search engines (such as
www.google.com).
CEO nationality is measured by a
dummy variable where score 1 for foreign
(non-Indonesian) CEO and score 0 for local
(Indonesian) CEO (Enofe et al. 2017). CEO
profile in the annual report provides
information whether CEO is Indonesian or
foreign.

Control Variables
Control variables include firms’ size,
leverage, firms’ growth, and CEO financial
expertise. Firms' size controls the firms'
resources to generate profit. Bigger firms
have higher resources to increase
profitability. Firms' size is measured by the
logarithm natural of total assets (JaraBertin and Sepulveda 2016). Leverage
shows the firms’ risks of financial and
default where higher risks lead to lower
profitability. Leverage is measured by the
ratio of debt to total assets (Rahman et al.
2020). Firms' growth shows the possibility
for firms to improve profitability (Jang and
Park 2011). This research uses asset growth
and sales growth as a proxy of firms'
growth. Asset growth is measured by total
assets change divided by lagged total assets. Sales growth is measured by sales
change divided by total assets. CEO
financial
expertise
controls
CEO
knowledge to reduce the financial risk to
improve profitability (Apergis 2019). CEO
financial expertise is measured by a
dummy variable where score 1 if CEO has
financial experiences and score 0 if
otherwise.
Empirical Model
To examine the effect of CEO
characteristics on pre-earnings management
profitability, this research uses firm and
year
fixed-effect
regression.
Firm
fixedeffect is used to control different
firms' characteristics to implement the
business strategy by the CEO. Year fixedeffect is used to control different CEO
tenure and age in each different year. The
regression model is as in equation 4.
ROAPre-EM(it)
is
pre-earnings
management return on assets of firm i in
the period of t. GENDER(it) is CEO gender
of firm i in the period of t. TENURE(it) is
CEO tenure of firm i in the period of t.
AGE(it) is the CEO age of firm i in the
period of t.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Variables of Profitability
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std.
and Earnings Management
Deviation
ROA
-0.3727
2.5401
0.0567
0.1558
DA
-0.8516
0.3405
0.0000
0.0802
ROApre-EM
-0.3612
2.3425
0.0567
0.1753
F-Statistics for variance difference between ROA and ROApre-EM
Winsorized ROA
-0.1393
0.2016
0.0429
0.0780
Winsorized DA
-0.1244
0.1247
0.0003
0.0576
Winsorized ROApre-EM
-0.2499
0.3221
0.0426
0.1014
F-Statistics for variance difference between Winsorized ROA and Winsorized ROApre-EM
Panel B. Continuous Variables of
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
CEO profile
TENURE
0.0000
47.0000
10.3300
AGE
32.0000
79.0000
55.0300
EDU
1.0000
5.0000
3.1400
Panel C. Dummy Variables of
No. of
Percent of
CEO profile
Sample
Total Sample
Male CEO
621
93.4 %
Female CEO
44
6.6 %
Non-founding family CEO
392
58.9 %
Founding-family CEO
273
41.1 %
Local CEO
550
82.7 %
Foreign CEO
115
17.3 %
CEO with no financial expertise
511
76.8 %
CEO with financial expertise
154
23.2 %
Panel D. Control Variables
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
SIZE
24.3182
33.4737
28.4323
LEV
0.0395
5.0733
0.5631
AG
-0.7918
4.8175
0.1329
SG
-3.3273
2.9459
0.0647
***significant in 0.01, #insignificant

Variance

K-S

0.0243
4.2453***
0.0064
2.4138***
0.0307
3.2918***
9.0076***
0.0061
1.3271#
0.0033
0.7219#
0.0103
0.7577#
38.5566***
Std. Deviation
10.7090
9.0630
0.7950

Std. Deviation
1.6739
0.5717
0.3945
0.3138

Source: Proceed data

EDU(it) is the CEO's education level of firm
i in the period of t. FAMILY(it) is CEO
founding-family status of firm i in the
period of t. NATION(it) is the CEO
nationality of firm i in the period of t.
SIZE(it) is the size of firm i in the period of
t. LEV(it) is the leverage of firm i in the
period of t. AG(it) is the assets growth of
firm i in the period of t. SG(it) is the sales
growth of firm i in the period of t.
FIN_EXP(it) is the CEO's financial expertise
of firm i in the period of t. This research
expects coefficients of b1 to b6 are positive
and significant.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the interest variables. In panel A, the
lowest and highest profitability (ROA)
respectively have the values of -0.3727 and
2.5401. The average value of profitability

is 0.0567 with a deviation of 0.1558. The
highest level of conservative profit-decreasing earnings management (the lowest
value of DA) is -0.8516. The highest level
of aggressive profit-increasing earnings
management (the highest value of DA) is
0.3405. The lowest value of pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM) is 0.3612 while the highest value of preearnings management profitability is
2.3425.
As the value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) for the variable of pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM) is
significant in 0.01, it shows that the data
are not distributed normally. To normalize
the data, there are the methods of trimming,
transformation, and winsorizing. This research use winsorizing method as trimming
will reduce the number of samples and
transformation (e.g. square root and logarithm natural) does not allow data with
negative values. This research winsorizes
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the extreme values of profitability (ROA)
and earnings management (DA) to
normalize the data. The extreme values are
determined by analysis of steams and leafs
based on a normal distribution curve. After
winsorizing, the lowest and highest winsorized profitability (winsorized ROA) respectively have the values of -0.1393 and
0.2016. The average value of winsorized
profitability is 0.0429 with a deviation of
0.078. The highest level of winsorized conservative profit-decreasing earnings management (the lowest value of winsorized
DA) is -0.1244. The highest level of
winsorized aggressive profit-increasing
earnings management (the highest value of
winsorized DA) is 0.1247. The lowest
value of winsorized pre-earnings management profitability (winsorized ROApre-EM) is
-0.2499 while the highest value of preearnings management profitability is 0.3221. Based on the value of
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S)
after
winsorizing, pre-earnings management
profitability (winsorized ROApre-EM) is distributed normally.
This
research
assumes
that
profitability before and after earnings
management is different since the strategy
selection of earnings management practice
leads to inconsistent findings of executive
directors and firms’ profitability. In panel
A, profitability (ROA) and pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM) have
the same average value as the average
value of discretionary accruals is the
average value of e in equation 2 that will
lead to zero. In this case, instead of examining the mean difference between
profitability (ROA) and pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM), this
research examines whether decreasing or
increasing (variability) of profitability
(ROA) is different from decreasing or increasing (variability) of pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM) by
using variance difference test. Before winsorizing, panel A shows that the value of Fstatistics for variance difference between
profitability (ROA) and pre-earnings
management profitability (ROApre-EM) is
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9.0076 (significant in 0.01). After
winsorizing, panel A shows that the value
of F-statistics for variance difference
between winsorized profitability (winsorized ROA) and pre-earnings management
profitability (winsorized ROApre-EM) is
38.5566 (significant in 0.01). It indicates
that variabilities of profitability and preearnings management profitability are
different. The result confirms this research
assumption where inconsistent findings of
executive directors and firms’ profitability
come from strategy selection of earnings
management practice.
Panel B shows that the shortest and
longest tenures of CEO (TENURE) respectively are 0 years and 47 years. Each CEO
has an average tenure of 10.3300 years
with a deviation of 10.7090 years. The
youngest and oldest ages of CEO (AGE)
respectively are 32 years old and 79 years
old. Each CEO has an average age of
55.0300 years old with a deviation of
9.0630 years. The lowest and highest education levels of CEO (EDU) respectively
are 1 (high school degree) and 5
(doctorate). Each CEO has an average education level of 3.1400 (around bachelor's
degree) with a deviation of 0.7950 scores
of education level.
Panel C shows that there are 621
male CEOs or 93.4% of the total 665 samples and 44 female CEOs or 6.6% of the
total 66 samples. There are 392 nonfounding family CEOs or 58.9% of the
total 665 samples and 273 founding-family
CEOs or 41.1% of the total 66 samples.
There are 550 local (Indonesian) CEOs or
82.7% of the total 665 samples and 273
foreign (non-Indonesian) CEOs or 17.3%
of the total 66 samples.
CEO Characteristics on Pre-Earnings
Management ROA
Table 3 shows that CEO gender
(GENDER) has a coefficient value of
0.0831 with a t-statistic of 3.1398
(significant in 0.01). The result indicates
that CEO gender has a positive effect on
pre-earnings management profitability.
CEO tenure (TENURE) has a coefficient
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Table 2
CEO Characteristics on Pre-Earnings Management ROA
Variable
Coefficient
GENDER
0.0831
TENURE
0.0022
AGE
-0.0001
EDU
0.0215
FAMILY
-0.0202
NATION
0.0545
SIZE
0.0109
LEV
-0.0578
AG
0.0632
SG
0.0075
FIN_EXP
-0.0206
Constant
-0.2950
Adjusted R-squared
0.1042
F-statistic
8.0184***
Firm-Effect
Yes
Year-Effect
Yes
***significant in 0.01,
**significant in 0.05

t-Statistic
3.1398***
2.4553**
-0.5330
2.2478**
-1.1180
2.9657***
2.675***
-4.9465***
3.7055***
0.3520
-1.2770

Prob.
0.0018
0.0143
0.5492
0.0249
0.2460
0.0031
0.0077
0.0000
0.0002
0.7250
0.2021

Source: Proceed data

value of 0.0022 with a t-statistic of 2.4553
(significant in 0.05). It indicates that CEO
tenure has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management profitability. CEO age (AGE)
has a coefficient value of -0.0001 with a tstatistic of -0.5330 (insignificant). There is
no significant effect of CEO age on preearnings management profitability. CEO
education level (EDU) has a coefficient
value of 0.0215 with a t-statistic of 2.2478
(significant in 0.05). It indicates that CEO
education level has a positive effect on preearnings management profitability. CEO
founding-family status (FAMILY) has a
coefficient value of -0.0202 with a tstatistic of -1.1180 (insignificant). There is
no significant effect of CEO foundingfamily status on pre-earnings management
profitability. CEO nationality (NATION)
has a coefficient value of 0.0545 with a tstatistic of 2.9657 (significant in 0.01). It
indicates CEO nationality has a positive
effect on pre-earnings management profitability, is accepted.
Discussion
This research aims to examine the
effect of CEO characteristics which are
gender, tenure, age, education level,
founding-family status, and foreign nation-

ality
on
pre-earnings
management
profitability. It is important to examine the
effect of CEO characteristics on
preearnings management profitability since
there is a previous findings gap of CEO
characteristics on firms’ profitability. Previous studies do not consider the earnings
management behavior by CEOs that give
biases to profitability achievement. By
examining the pre-earnings management
profitability, this research is expected to fill
the gap in previous findings gap and provide the CEO performance of profitability
without engaging in earnings management.
The first result shows that CEO
gender has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management profitability. It indicates that
H1, where female CEO has a positive effect
on pre-earnings management profitability,
is accepted. The result is consistent with
Jalbert et al. (2013) and Susanti et al.
(2018) who find that female executive
directors increase firms’ performance. The
result is also supported by Barua et al.
(2010) and Peni and Vahamaa (2010) who
find female executive directors are less engaged in aggressive earnings management
to boost up firms’ profitability. In the context of profitability improvement, a female
CEO has the characteristics of stable and
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mature emotion, and also the ability of
multitasking. A stable and mature behavior
leads a female CEO to make a decision
carefully and effectively. Careful and effective decision-making improves the strategy's success, further, it will increase profitability. A multitasking characteristic makes
a female CEO can do various things at the
same time and leads to higher efficiency. In
the context of earnings management
behavior, a female CEO has a characteristic
of risk-averse. A risk-averse behavior leads
a female CEO to avoid an aggressive
strategy, such as earnings management to
increase profitability. Although risk-averse
behavior leads a female CEO to engage
more in conservative profit-decreasing
earnings management, it only occurs when
she faces an uncertain condition. This
research finds that a female CEO can also
achieve higher profitability without
engaging in both aggressive profitincreasing and conservative profitdecreasing earnings management.
The second result shows that CEO
tenure has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management profitability. It indicates that
H2, where CEO tenure has a positive effect
on pre-earnings management profitability,
is accepted. The result is consistent with
Juenke (2005) and Shakir (2009) who find
that longer CEO tenure increases firms’
performance. The result is also supported
by Ali and Zhang (2015) who find that
longer tenure CEO is less engaged in
aggressive
earnings-profit
earnings
management. Longer tenure CEO has the
characteristics of more experience,
knowledge, and understanding of firms’
business. It helps the CEO to implement an
effective business strategy and increase
firms’ profitability without engaging in
earnings management. On the other hand,
shorter tenure CEO improve profitability
by engaging in aggressive earnings-profit
earnings management since there is a
punishment for shorter tenure CEOs'
failure. A shorter tenure CEO fails to
achieve better performance without
engaging
in
earnings
management
behavior.

133

The third result shows that there is no
significant effect of CEO age on
preearnings management profitability. It
indicates that H3, where CEO age has a
positive effect on pre-earnings management
profitability, is rejected. The result is consistent with Amin and Sunarjanto (2016)
and Eduardo and Poole (2016) who find no
significant relationship between executive’
age and firms’ performance. Peni (2014)
suggests that older CEO can increase profitability by using longer life experience and
working careers to implement effective
business strategies without engaging in
earnings management. Meanwhile, there is
also a possibility that younger CEO can
increase profitability without engaging in
earnings management. Wei et al. (2005)
explain that younger CEO has more fresh
idea, are faster in decision making, and are
more innovative. Although older CEO increases the probability of a firm's survival,
younger CEO that has characteristics of a
more fresh idea, faster decision-making,
and more innovation is needed by firms
that rely more on innovation and creativity
(Belenzon et al. 2019). It indicates that the
relationship between CEO age and firms'
profitability does not occur without
considering the factors of business survival
and the needs of innovation and creativity.
The fourth result shows that CEO
education level has a positive effect on preearnings management profitability. It indicates that H4, where CEO education level
has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management profitability, is accepted. The
result is consistent with Cheng et al. (2010)
who find that higher education had by the
executive board increases firms' performance. CEO with higher education levels
has the characteristics of higher thinking
complexity, cognitive ability, and innovation. It helps the CEO to provide better
business analysis and information to formulate an effective strategy and leads to
higher profitability. Interestingly, a previous study (e.g.(Qi et al. 2018) finds that
executive directors with higher education
levels tend to use their ability to have
higher knowledge of firms' financial
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reporting environment and engage more in
earnings management. Based on the result
in this research and previous finding, CEO
with higher education levels can improve
profitability by engaging either with or
without earnings management behavior. It
indicates that the relationship between CEO
education level, profitability, and earnings
management can be examined more deeply
by considering the monitoring on how
CEOs with higher education levels use
their ability to improve performance.
The fifth result shows that there is no
significant effect of CEO founding-family
status on pre-earnings management
profitability. It indicates that H5, where
founding-family CEO has a positive effect
on pre-earnings management profitability,
is rejected. The insignificant result may
come from the family interests of socioemotional wealth. Socioemotional wealth
refers to the family interests in the emotional attachment to the firm, other family
members' wealth, and reputation (Kalm and
Gomez-Mejia 2016). Kalm and GomezMejia (2016) explain that the founding
family has an interest more in socioemotional wealth than financial performance.
Although founding-family CEOs have
more effective monitoring functions and
higher knowledge of the firms’ business
since the firms are founded, they will use it
more to fulfill the family interests than financial performance. It indicates that the
relationship between CEO founding-family
status and firms’ profitability does not
occur without considering the factors of
socioemotional wealth.
The sixth result shows that CEO nationality has a positive effect on preearnings management profitability. It indicates that H6, where foreign (nonIndonesian) CEO has a positive effect on
pre-earnings management profitability, is
accepted. The result is consistent with Le
and Kroll (2017) who find a positive effect
of foreign CEO on performance. The result
is also supported by Chiu et al. (2013) and
Enofe et al. (2017) who find that foreign
directors are less engaged in earnings
management behavior. A foreign (non-

Indonesian) CEO has the characteristic of a
cross-country network. A unique competitive advantage of cross-country market
knowledge helps a foreign CEO to improve
a firms' global market network and increase
profitability without engaging in earnings
management. On the other hand, since a
local (Indonesian) CEO still brings the
culture of politeness to other local executives, there is a possibility that a local
(Indonesian) CEO improves profitability by
engaging in aggressive profit-increasing
earnings management.
The result implies firms be selective
to choose a CEO. Since earnings management causes the biased profitability evaluation, firms should choose female CEO, foreign CEO, longer tenure CEO, or CEOs
with higher education levels to improve
profitability without engaging in earnings
management behavior. The result also implies firms do not frequently change the
longer tenure CEOs with the new ones and
formulate the scholarship program for CEO
to achieve higher education degrees.
The result also implies a corporate
governance system in Indonesia. Firms in
Indonesia implement the two-tier board
system and concentrated ownership. A twotier board system allows independent monitoring on CEO as the board of
commissioners (supervisory/non-executive
board) is separated from the board of executive directors (executive board). However,
the two-tier board system does not provide
knowledge sharing and efficient information flow between the board of commissioners and the CEO. Female CEO with
higher cognitive ability, longer tenure CEO
with longer experience, CEO with higher
education level who has higher cognitive
ability and knowledge, and foreign CEO
with higher global business knowledge can
mitigate the disadvantage of knowledge
sharing in two-tier board system and allow
CEO to improve profitability.
Concentrated ownership provides
controlling shareholders effective monitoring of the CEO to improve shareholders’
value by increasing profitability. However,
there is a probability that controlling
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(3)
shareholders abuse their power to gain
private benefits by engaging in earnings
management. Female CEO with higher
ethical behavior and risk-averse, and
foreign (non-Indonesian) CEO who are
more independent and transparent can
avoid the earnings management behavior in
the condition of concentrated ownership.
The result has some limitations. First,
the result fails to capture the effect of CEO
age and pre-earnings management profitability since this research does not consider
the factors of business survival and needs
of innovation and creativity that can
increase the possibility of younger CEO to
improve profitability without engaging in
earnings management. Future research is
expected to consider the factors of business
survival and needs of innovation and
creativity to capture the possibility that
younger CEO also can improve profitability without engaging in earnings
management. Second, the result captures
the positive effect of CEO education level
on pre-earnings management profitability
in the assumption that CEO with lower
education level tend to engage in aggressive profit-increasing earnings management
since CEO with lower education level has
lower analysis ability that can lead to ineffective strategy. Meanwhile, based on the
previous study, there is a possibility that
CEO with higher education level also engages in aggressive profit-increasing earnings management. Future research is
expected to control the use of higher analysis ability by CEO with higher education
levels, such as considering the monitoring
mechanism to control the behavior of CEO
with higher education levels. Third, the result fails to capture the effect of CEO
founding-family status and pre-earnings
management profitability since this research does not consider the family interest
of socioemotional wealth where financial
performance of profitability comes in second place after family interest. Future re-

search is expected to consider considering
the factors of socioemotional wealth.
Alternative Analysis
This research also runs an alternative
analysis. For the first alternative analysis,
this research examines the effect of CEO
characteristics on firms’ profitability by
using market-based measurement. Return
on assets is accounting-based profitability
that contains accounting judgment and estimation. Since earnings management takes
advantage of accounting standard loophole
(Scott 2014), return on assets also contains
earnings management behavior. Marketbased profitability relies on stock market
participant evaluation of firms' prospects
that has minimum accounting judgment and
estimation (Salinger 1984). Market-based
profitability is measured by the market
value to assets ratio. The market value to
assets ratio is calculated by the market
value of firms’ shares divided by total
assets. The market value of a firms’ share is
calculated by share price multiplied by total
outstanding share. The result first alternative analysis is as in table 5.
For the second alternative analysis,
this research examines the effect of CEO
characteristics on pre-earnings management
profitability by using a Jones-Modified
model of discretionary accruals as an alternative model of earnings management estimation. The result of the second alternative
analysis is as in table 6. Jones-Modified
model of discretionary accruals is as in
equation (3).
For the third alternative analysis, this
research examines the effect of CEO
characteristics on pre-earnings management
profitability by considering the level of
firms’ risk. Pre-earnings management
profitability is adjusted with firms’ risk.
Firms’ risk is shown by the standard deviation of pre-earnings management return on
assets for each firm along the research period (Jara-Bertin and Sepulveda 2016).
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Alternative Analysis
Variable
MVA
ROA
DAJones Modified
ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)
Risk-adjusted ROAPre-EM
Ln MVA
Winsorized Ln MVA
Winsorized ROA
Winsorized DAJones Modified
Winsorized ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)
Winsorized Risk-adjusted ROAPre-EM
***significant in 0.01, #insignificant

Minimum
0.0000
-0.3727
-0.8553
-0.3151
-3.7118
-21.1654
-3.1925
-0.1393
-0.1560
-0.2281
-3.7118

Maximum
54.7062
2.5401
2.1129
0.8250
9.5106
4.0020
2.7483
0.2016
0.1421
0.3380
4.0029

Mean
1.5191
0.0567
0.0000
0.0567
0.7488
-0.6442
-0.6313
0.0429
-0.0028
0.0458
0.6297

Std. Deviation
4.0967
0.1558
0.1333
0.1302
1.7681
1.5433
1.2808
0.0780
0.0641
0.0905
1.4380

K-S
9.1944***
4.2453***
4.7425***
2.6213***
2.4320***
1.6738***
1.1568#
1.3271#
0.7219#
0.7430#
1.2820#

Source: Proceed data

(4)
Risk-adjusted pre-earnings management
profitability is measured by pre-earnings
management return on assets divided by the
standard deviation of pre-earnings management return on assets (Jara-Bertin and
Sepulveda 2016). Higher risk-adjusted preearnings management profitability indicates
higher profitability with lower risk. The
result third alternative analysis is as in table
7. Risk-adjusted pre-earnings management
profitability is calculated as in equation (4).
The descriptive statistic of interest
variables for alternative analysis is as in
table 4. It includes variables of market
value to assets ratio, pre-earnings management profitability by using a JonesModified model of discretionary accruals,
and risk-adjusted pre-earnings management
profitability.
Table 4 shows that variables of market value to assets ratio (MVA), preearnings management profitability by using
a Jones-Modified model of discretionary
accruals (ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)), and riskadjusted pre-earnings management profitability (Risk-adjusted ROAPre-EM) have
values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) that
are significant in 0.01. It indicates that the
variables are not distributed normally. This
research uses the data normalization
method that does not reduce the number of
samples, which are transformation (natural
logarithm) and winsorizing methods.

After transformation, the natural
logarithm of market value to assets ratio
(Ln MVA) has a value of KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S) that is significant in 0.01. It
indicates that the natural logarithm of the
market value to assets ratio is still not distributed normally. The next step to
normalize the data is winsorizing the natural logarithm of the market value to assets
ratio. After winsorizing, winsorized natural
logarithm of market value to assets ratio
(winsorized Ln MVA) has an insignificant
value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S). It
indicates that winsorized natural logarithm
of market value to assets ratio is distributed
normally.
After
winsorizing,
winsorized
profitability (winsorized ROA) and winsorized earnings management by using a
Jones-Modified model of discretionary
accruals (winsorized DAJones Modified) have
insignificant values of KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S). It indicates that winsorized
profitability and winsorized earnings
management by using a Jones-Modified
model of discretionary accruals are distributed normally. It leads the winsorized preearnings management profitability by using
a Jones-Modified model of discretionary
accruals (winsorized ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)) to have a normal distribution with an
insignificant value of KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S).
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Table 5
CEO Characteristics on Market Value to Assets Ratio
Variable
Coefficient
GENDER
0.2461
TENURE
0.0055
AGE
0.0002
EDU
0.3277
FAMILY
-0.0230
NATION
0.1280
SIZE
0.0827
LEV
-0.7090
AG
0.0802
SG
0.2797
FIN_EXP
-0.3264
Constant
-3.6631
Dependent Variable Winsorized Ln MVA
Adjusted R-squared
0.1750
F-statistic
13.8055***
Firm-Effect
Yes
Year-Effect
Yes
***significant in 0.01, *significant in 0.10

t-Statistic
1.3252
0.8870
0.0356
4.8775***
-0.1813
0.9925
2.8897***
-8.6508***
0.6707
1.8803*
-2.8871***

Prob.
0.1856
0.3754
0.9716
0.0000
0.8562
0.3213
0.0040
0.0000
0.5026
0.0605
0.0040

Source: Proceed data

After winsorizing, winsorized riskadjusted
pre-earnings
management
profitability (winsorized Risk-adjusted
ROAPre-EM) has an insignificant value of
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S). It indicates
that winsorized risk-adjusted pre-earnings
management profitability is distributed
normally. In this case, variables of winsorized logarithm natural of market value to
assets ratio (winsorized Ln MVA), winsorized
pre-earnings
management
profitability by using a Jones-Modified
model of discretionary accruals (winsorized
ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)), and winsorized
risk-adjusted pre-earnings management
profitability (winsorized Risk-adjusted
ROAPre-EM) are used in the alternative
analysis as in table 5, 6, and 7.
Table 5 shows that CEO gender
(GENDER) has a coefficient value of
0.2461 with a t-statistic of 1.3252
(insignificant in). It indicates that there is
no significant effect of female CEO on the
market value to assets ratio. CEO tenure
(TENURE) has a coefficient value of
0.0055 with a t-statistic of 0.8870
(insignificant). It indicates that there is no
significant effect of CEO tenure on the
market value to assets ratio. CEO age
(AGE) has a coefficient value of 0.0002
with a t-statistic of 0.0356 (insignificant). It

indicates that there is no significant effect
of CEO age on the market value to assets
ratio. CEO education level (EDU) has a
coefficient value of 0.3277 with a t-statistic
of 4.8775 (significant in 0.01). It indicates
that CEO education level has a positive
effect on market value to assets ratio. CEO
founding-family status (FAMILY) has a
coefficient value of -0.0230 with a tstatistic of -0.1813 (insignificant). It indicates that there is no significant effect of
the founding-family CEO on the market
value to assets ratio. CEO nationality
(NATION) has a coefficient value of
0.1280 with a t-statistic of 0.9925
(insignificant). It indicates that there is no
significant effect of foreign CEO on the
market value to assets ratio. In the first
alternative analysis, the result of CEO age,
CEO education level, CEO foundingfamily status is consistent with the main
result of table 3. On the other hand, the
main results of CEO gender, CEO tenure,
and CEO nationality are sensitive if profitability involves the stock market participant
evaluation. The only CEO characteristic
that has an effect on market value to total
assets ratio is CEO education level. It indicates that stock market participant
considers the CEO education level to evaluate the firms' prospects.
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Table 6
CEO Characteristics on Pre-Earnings Management ROA (Jones-Modified)
Variable
Coefficient
t-Statistic
GENDER
0.0240
2.0369**
TENURE
0.0019
2.9498***
AGE
-0.0007
-1.0891
EDU
0.0209
2.9831***
FAMILY
-0.0156
-1.1743
NATION
0.0488
3.6294***
SIZE
0.0101
3.3746***
LEV
-0.0559
-6.5419***
AG
0.0112
0.8994
SG
0.0298
1.9202*
FIN_EXP
-0.0285
-1.4687
Constant
-0.2454
Dependent Variable Winsorized ROApre-EM (Jones Modified)
Adjusted R-squared
0.1310
F-statistic
10.0996***
Firm-Effect
Yes
Year-Effect
Yes
***significant in 0.01, **significant in 0.05, *significant in 0.10

Prob.
0.0421
0.0033
0.2765
0.0030
0.2407
0.0003
0.0008
0.0000
0.3688
0.0553
0.1424

Source: Proceed data

Table 6 shows that CEO gender
(GENDER) has a coefficient value of
0.0240 with a t-statistic of 2.0369 (significant in 0.05). It indicates that female CEO
has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management (Jones-Modified) profitability.
CEO tenure (TENURE) has a coefficient
value of 0.0019 with a t-statistic of 2.9498
(significant in 0.01). It indicates that CEO
tenure has a positive effect on pre-earnings
management (Jones-Modified) profitability.
CEO age (AGE) has a coefficient value of 0.0007 with a t-statistic of -1.0891 (insignificant). It indicates that there is no
significant effect of CEO age on preearnings management (Jones-Modified)
profitability. CEO education level (EDU)
has a coefficient value of 0.0209 with a tstatistic of 2.9831 (significant in 0.01). It
indicates that CEO education level has a
positive effect on pre-earnings management
(Jones-Modified)
profitability.
CEO
founding-family status (FAMILY) has a
coefficient value of -0.0156 with a tstatistic of -1.1743 (insignificant). It indicates that there is no significant effect of
the founding-family CEO on pre-earnings
management (Jones-Modified) profitability.
CEO nationality (NATION) has a coeffi-

cient value of 0.0488 with a t-statistic of
3.6294 (significant in 0.01). It indicates that
foreign (non-Indonesian) CEO has a positive effect on pre-earnings management
(Jones-Modified) profitability. The result of
the second alternative analysis is consistent
with the main result of table 3.
Table 7 shows that CEO gender
(GENDER) has a coefficient value of
0.6947 with a t-statistic of 3.2698 (significant in 0.01). It indicates that female CEO
has a positive effect on risk-adjusted preearnings management profitability. CEO
tenure (TENURE) has a coefficient value
of 0.0051 with a t-statistic of 0.7317 (insignificant). It indicates that there is no effect
of CEO tenure on risk-adjusted preearnings management profitability. CEO
age (AGE) has a coefficient value of
0.0032 with a t-statistic of 0.4365
(insignificant). It indicates that there is no
effect of CEO age on risk-adjusted preearnings management profitability. CEO
education level (EDU) has a coefficient
value of 0.0945 with a t-statistic of 1.2295
(insignificant). It indicates that there is no
effect of CEO education level on riskadjusted
pre-earnings
management
profitability. CEO founding-family status
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Table 7
CEO Characteristics on Pre-Earnings Management ROA (Risk-Adjusted)
Variable
Coefficient
t-Statistic
GENDER
0.6947
3.2698***
TENURE
0.0051
0.7317
AGE
0.0032
0.4365
EDU
0.0945
1.2295
FAMILY
0.1225
0.8433
NATION
0.2663
1.8049*
SIZE
0.1942
5.9522***
LEV
-0.5561
-5.9302***
AG
0.1218
0.8902
SG
0.4676
2.7475***
FIN_EXP
-0.2778
-2.1476**
Constant
-5.2487
Dependent Variable Winsorized Risk-Adjusted ROAPre-EM
Adjusted R-squared
0.1433
F-statistic
11.0943***
Firm-Effect
Yes
Year-Effect
Yes
***significant in 0.01, **significant in 0.05, *significant in 0.10

Prob.
0.0011
0.4646
0.6626
0.2193
0.3994
0.0715
0.0000
0.0000
0.3737
0.0062
0.0321

Source: Proceed data

(FAMILY) has a coefficient value of
0.1225 with a t-statistic of 0.8433
(insignificant). It indicates that there is no
effect of CEO founding-family status on
risk-adjusted pre-earnings management
profitability. CEO nationality (NATION)
has a coefficient value of 0.2663 with a tstatistic of 1.8049 (significant in 0.10). It
indicates that foreign (non-Indonesian)
CEO has a positive effect on risk-adjusted
pre-earnings management profitability. In
the third alternative analysis, the result of
CEO gender, CEO age, CEO foundingfamily status, and CEO nationality are consistent with the main results of table 3. On
the other hand, the CEO characteristics of
tenure and education level are not consistent with the main result of table 3. It
indicates that the effect of CEO characteristics of tenure and education level on preearnings management profitability is sensitive to firms’ risk factors. The CEO characteristics that have an effect on risk-adjusted
pre-earnings management profitability are
CEO gender and CEO nationality. It indicates that female and foreign (nonIndonesian) CEOs can generate higher
profitability with lower risk.

CONCLUSION
This research aims to examine the
effect of CEO characteristics on preearnings management profitability. Based
on the firm and year fixed-effect regression, the result shows that female CEO,
longer tenure CEO, CEO with higher education levels, and foreign CEO increase
firms' profitability without engaging in
earnings management. On the other hand,
there is no effect of CEO age and foundingfamily status on pre-earnings management
profitability.
This research implies firms. First,
firms are expected to appoint a CEO either
a female, an older, a foreign, or a higher
educated CEO to increase profitability
without using earnings management.
Second, firms are expected to provide a
scholarship or additional training for CEO
with lower education levels to increase
CEO ability. Third, firms are expected to
increase monitoring and controlling functions to ensure CEO do not engage in
earnings management that leads to a biased
performance evaluation. This research also
implies the CEO. First, a CEO with a lower
education level is expected to take a higher
education degree to increase cognitive
ability. Second, CEO with shorter tenure is
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expected to improve their experience and
knowledge to increase profitability. This
research also implies the corporate governance system in Indonesia. By appointing
female, higher education, and foreign
CEOs, the disadvantage of knowledge
sharing in a two-tier board system and
earnings management in concentrated ownership can be mitigated.
This research has limitations. First,
this research does not consider the factor of
firms’ survival and business needs of innovation and creativity to determine the contribution of younger and older CEOs on
firms’ profitability. Based on Belenzon et
al. (Belenzon et al. 2019), younger CEO
increases firms’ profitability that lies on
creativity and innovation while older CEO
increases firms’ business survival. Second,
this research does not consider the factor of
founding-family needs of socioemotional
wealth to determine the contribution of
founding-family CEO on firms’ profitability. Based on Kalm and Gomez-Mejia
(2016), the founding family has an interest
more in socioemotional wealth such as
emotional attachment to the firm, other
family members' wealth, and reputation.
Third, this research assumes that CEO with
lower education level tends to engage in
aggressive profit-increasing earnings management since CEO with lower education
level has lower analysis ability which can
lead to ineffective strategy. Meanwhile, Qi
et al. (2018) find that CEO with higher
education level also engages in aggressive
profit-increasing earnings management.
Fourth, this research uses accruals earnings
management that is measured by discretionary accruals since previous studies only
provide pre-earnings management profitability measurement based on discretionary
accruals and there are no previous studies
that provide pre-earnings management
profitability measurement based on real
earnings management.
There are some suggestions for future
research. First, future research is expected
to consider the factor of firms’ survival and
business needs of innovation and creativity
to examine the CEO age and firms’

profitability. Second, future research is
expected to consider the socioemotional
wealth to examine the CEO foundingfamily status and firms’ profitability. Third,
future research is expected to control the
use of higher analysis ability by CEO with
higher education levels, such as
considering the monitoring mechanism to
control the behavior of CEO with higher
education levels. Fourth, future research is
expected to examine pre-earnings management profitability based on real earnings
management practice.
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